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TRADITION, CULTURE, AND
THE PROBLEM OF INCLUSION IN PHILOSOPHY
JUSTIN E. H. SMITH
ABSTRACT: Many today agree that philosophy, as an academic discipline, must, for the
sake of its very survival, become more inclusive of a wider range of perspectives, coming
from a more diverse pool of philosophers. Yet there has been little serious reflection on how
our very idea of what philosophy is might be preventing this change from taking place. In this
essay I would like to consider the ways in which our ideas about philosophy's relation to
tradition, and its relation to other dimensions of human culture, influence efforts to promote
greater diversity in the field.
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1.
Sometimes it is said that “the past is a foreign country”, and indeed it may be that
here we have the first and most formidable expression of philosophy’s exclusionary
character, of its xenophobia, if you will. This is a chronological xenophobia, also
sometimes called ‘presentism’, which imagines the inhabitants of the past much in the
way that ethnocentrists, as for example Eurocentrists, imagine the people in other
parts of the world: as children, as a developmental stage on the way to the final
version of humanity, which is represented by ourselves. Of course there is no political
urgency to deal with this form of exclusion. The country of the past has a current
population of zero; its inhabitants are all dead, and it is of no concern to them whether
we regard them as equals or not. But this exclusion may still be helping to maintain,
in unseen ways, other forms of exclusion that do very much affect the living.
For one thing, while the people of the past are themselves dead, recognition of
their accomplishments, of their contributions to traditions, can give force or authority
to the speech of the living today. Yet the presentist tendency in Anglo-American
philosophy has made it difficult or impossible to affirm the significance of traditions.
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What this means in actual practice is that there is only one recognized tradition, the
Anglo-American one, but it does not conceive itself, for the most part, as a tradition.
Rather, it is supposed to be a neutral and universal method for the apprehension of
truth. This means that if you have been brought up to think philosophically, in a maṭh
a madrasa, in a lineage of masters and of textual authorities that extends back a
thousand years, the claims you make from your position embedded within this lineage
can have no particular force, from the point of view of the Anglo-American
philosophical presentist, as philosophical claims. On the terms on which the academic
discipline is currently defined, there can be no dialogue of equals across traditions,
since the perception reigns that it is only the other member of the attempted dialogue
who belongs to a tradition at all, and that this is intrinsically an inferior form of
engagement with ideas.
It is true, of course, that today there are few explicit presentists in the AngloAmerican philosophical tradition. Most do not openly agree with Gilbert Harman’s
legendary injunction, as the sign on his Princeton office door said, “Just say no to the
history of philosophy!” In the 1980s Harman himself explained that he took his views
to be “mostly orthodox”. These views were never meant to denigrate the study of the
history of philosophy in general, but only to dispute the supposed need for students of
philosophy to study it. Harman is reported to have regretted upsetting people by
distinguishing between philosophy and the history of philosophy, but to have averred
that he did not fully comprehend the reasons for the upset (Sorell and Rogers 2005,
43-44).
Harman had the lucidity to denounce what he called, following Walter Kaufmann,
‘exegetical thinking’, in which one’s own views are read into a “sacred” text, “so that
one can read them back out endowed with authority" (Sorell and Rogers 2005, 43-44).
Harman rightly found this form of engagement with the past suspicious, and so
preferred to conceive the project of philosophy as one that can do without the past
altogether.
Interestingly, Harman cites Margaret Dauler Wilson, his “late friend”, as a
historian of philosophy who is engaged in an intellectual project that is venerable, but
still different from his own (Sorell and Rogers 2005, 43-44). Wilson wrote in 1992 of
the tremendous upsurge of interest in the history of philosophy within American
philosophy departments, and of the accompanying improvement of scholarly
standards, notably in the mastery of the necessary languages and of the relevant
philological skills. For her it was important to establish that the history of philosophy
could be proven to be part of the same broad endeavor from which Harman had
sought to separate it. In the end, the crucial question for Wilson is to determine, as
she puts it, “how much reason [there is] to think that all this activity is likely to bear
philosophical fruit” (Wilson 1992, 193). Simply coming to know that Descartes made
this or that philosophical argument, in this or that text, in response to this or that set
of problems, is not itself doing philosophy. For Wilson, the historian of philosophy
begins doing philosophy when he or she takes Descartes’s arguments and shows how
they can be put to use for the resolution of problems of current concern.
Arguably, such an approach could be thought of as “exegetical thinking” in
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Harman’s sense: attempting to endow one’s own philosophical project with the
authority of a respected elder: hence Harman’s denial of tradition, of the idea that
philosophy has elders at all. Wilson would certainly not see her engagement with
Descartes in this way. For her, Descartes is worth going to not because he is a
respected elder, but because he is a source, potentially, of true arguments, for the
resolution of current problems.
One might suppose that the expectation of philosophical fruit, as expressed by
Wilson and like-minded historians of philosophy, emerged in part as a result of
pressure from the much more powerful forces of Harman and like-minded nonhistorian philosophers. That is, in order to prove our worth, and Descartes’ worth, the
historians of philosophers imagined, we needed to prove that Descartes had
something to say about problems a philosopher such as Harman would be prepared to
recognize as philosophical. This is not to deny that Wilson sincerely had positive
philosophical aims and interests of her own, but only to explain how it may have
come about that an understanding such as Wilson’s of the relationship of the history
of philosophy to philosophy came to dominate in American philosophy: an
understanding on which philology, linguistic training, the study of the diversity of
human cultures and of styles of expression, is only ever a means to an end, rather than
an end in itself, only ever part of the tool-kit, rather than something constitutive of the
very nature of the undertaking. We are not identifying with a cultural tradition, but
only mining for resources.
One may also ask why, if it is true or useful arguments we are after, rather than
inscribing ourselves in a tradition, we should focus to such a remarkable degree on
the intellectual output of a small number of prominent figures from the European past
who for their part did see themselves as working within a tradition (to varying
degrees of course: after all, Descartes, just like Harman after him, went to great
lengths to conceal his intellectual debt to his predecessors). Why go truth-mining only
within a predetermined and extremely narrow philosophical canon? What if the
greater reserves of truth are not to be found in the narrow shafts of the few known
mines, but rather in the great beds of the world’s literary, religious, scientific, and
legal traditions? What if the proper equipment to extract it is not only the pick-axe
and the assayer’s glass (the equipment of the close reader of few texts), but also the
telescope, the world map, the aerial survey?
2.
There are two related reasons for the limitation of the history of philosophy to known
mines, of relatively easy access. The first is that, typically, in looking at history for
answers to current philosophical problems, we are necessarily limiting ourselves to
known philosophical problems. We are looking to the past for new answers, not new
questions. This means that willy-nilly, and however we may think about what we are
doing, we are working within a tradition, namely, the historical lineage of the people
who have engaged with a particular set of questions that we, in the present, see as
more or less exhausting the list of questions that might be asked under the banner of
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philosophy. If we were in fact only truth-mining, looking for past ideas that might
bear philosophical fruit, rather than joining up with a particular tradition, then we
would be equally interested in discovering true, or plausible, answers to questions we
have not even asked, perhaps questions we had never even thought of asking. Thus,
again, a figure like Harman, who by his own lights rejects tradition tout court,
ironically ends up putting pressure on historians of philosophy such as Wilson to stay
true to a tradition, in order to be able to come up with answers from that tradition that
Harman would be prepared to recognize as true and valuable on tradition-independent
grounds.
The questions we didn't even think of asking, not surprisingly, often stem from
intellectual traditions in regions more or less geographically and culturally removed
from Europe. There is a continuity of conversation in what has come to be thought of
as “Western” philosophy. Even if Heraclitus wrote in a very different idiom, and
thought about what he was doing in a very different way than, say, Descartes or
Kripke later would, there is nonetheless a retroactive subsumption of Heraclitus and
other citizens of the foreign past into the same tradition that would also later include
the professors in academic philosophy departments in the Anglo-American world.
Such retroactive measures cannot be taken freely, to include just anyone from the past
in the same continuous conversation. They must, rather, have taken place already in
the distant past. They must have a long and venerable legacy. In other words, the
rules that govern which figures Wilson might go to in search of answers to
philosophical problems are, precisely, the rules of tradition.
3.
For reasons that go well beyond the history of ideas, Anglo-American philosophy
emerges out of a tradition that includes Greeks, but excludes Indians. Since the 19th
century, there have been attempts, many of them initiated in Germany, to revise the
ancient canon, and to provide a new interpretation of the history of philosophy that
retroactively includes the work of at least the members of the six Orthodox schools of
Indian philosophy, and certain of the Unorthodox schools, notably Buddhism. But for
the most part the Western philosophical tradition, even among people who refuse to
see it as a tradition (either for the Harmanian reason that philosophy ought have no
constitutive dependence on its past at all, or for the Wilsonian reason that we are only
looking for truth, and are simply happy to receive it from people of the past who were
asking the same sort of questions), has been unwilling to permit such a radical
retroactive transformation of its past.
What is the nature of this resistance? Here we come to the second of the two
related reasons for the limitation of the history of philosophy to a few familiar mine
shafts. The 19th century, again, saw considerable interest among some European
philosophers in plumbing the depths of the Vedas, and in welcoming Indian thought
as an expression of the sort of archaic “authenticity” that was also found in classical
Greece but was, some thought, compromised or vitiated by Judeo-Christian and
“Semitic” influence. But for all the enthusiasm of Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and the
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many philosophically inclined German Orientalists, there was a simultaneous surge in
interest in defining the project of philosophy to explicitly exclude “Oriental”
traditions. This was a move that had never seemed necessary until the real possibility
arose, and concrete examples were given to show, that European philosophers might
actually do philosophy as well or better by reading the Upanishads as by reading
Aristotle or Kant.
G. W. F. Hegel, in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy of 1825-26,
represents a very clear instance of this reaction, of this unprecedented
Europeanization of philosophy. This reaction would prove triumphant by the end of
the 19th century, and in important respects remains the implicit vision of philosophy
held by Hegelians and anti-Hegelians alike today. Bertrand Russell, who had had his
anti-Idealist break at the close of the fin-de-siècle, and who would spend the rest of
his career intermittently disparaging the Hegelian legacy, nonetheless repeats, in his
own History of Western Philosophy of 1945, the same basic prejudice Hegel himself
had expressed in his Lectures more than a century earlier. According to this prejudice,
Oriental philosophy does not belong in the main body of any proper survey of the
history of philosophy. In his Lectures Hegel does treat the various Oriental
traditions—in which he includes not only India and China, but also the ancient
learning of Mesopotamia, Iran, Syria, Egypt—but only does so in the Introduction.
Part One of the work, the real beginning, sets out from Greece.
On Hegel’s view, Oriental philosophy fails to qualify as philosophy in the true
sense, insofar as it remains thoroughly intermixed with religion, mythology, ritual,
and other forms of spiritual and cultural life. Philosophy comes into being in earnest
when it becomes autonomous from the cultural life of its practitioners, and this in turn
is possible only under historical conditions, such as those that first obtained in
classical Greece, in which men experience themselves as free individuals. To the
extent that philosophy becomes newly autonomous from spiritual life in ancient
Greece, however, there is a corresponding decline in the philosophical profundity of
Greek religion. Its gods are conceived simply as individuals, rather than as
representatives of concepts, whereas, for example, the Zoroastrian gods are not really
individuals at all, but rather only “representations”, and thus incitements to
philosophize:
Individuality, as long as there is a lack of freedom, is not firm, and where the general
representations are also individually constructed, it is still only superficial form. This is
the main reason why Oriental representations appear to us at once as philosophical
thoughts. As we hear from the Greeks of an Ouranos, Kronos—time, but also already
individualized—we find among the Persians Zurvan Akurana, but this is unbounded time.
We find Ahura Mazda and Angra Mainyu as the general sages, as representations; they
appear as general principles, which thus seem to have a kinship with philosophy, or
appear themselves as philosophers (Hegel 1993, 366).1
1

“Die Individualität, weil die Freiheit mangelt, ist nicht fest, und wo die allgemeinen Vorstellungen
auch individuell gebildet sind, ist es doch nur oberflächliche Form. Dies ist der Hauptgrund, weshalb
die orientalischen Vorstellungen uns gleich als philosophische Gedanken erscheinen. Wie wir bei den
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The Persians thus get whatever limited philosophy they can from religion, while the
Greeks have a religion with no philosophy, and a philosophy that, unfettered from
other domains of culture, offers depths without limit. But if philosophy must be
autonomous from culture in order to be true philosophy, then the study of the cultureembedded philosophy of the Orient must not fall within the purview of academic
philosophers. It must rather fall within the various scholarly disciplines of what was
once called Orientalism, Indology, Sinology, etc., and would later be redubbed --in
the hope of breaking free from the political legacy of these older traditions—“South
Asian Studies”, “East Asian Studies”, and so on.
And this is in fact what has occurred: Hegel’s argument triumphed. Philosophy is
not supposed to be concerned with the sort of human ideation that comes inextricably
embedded in cultural forms such as religion and ritual. But in the Orient, the old
Hegelian prejudice has it, there is no such autonomous philosophy, but only more or
less philosophical manifestations of culture. Therefore Indian thought is not studied
by the philosopher, but by the Indologist. Or, to update this slightly (and only
slightly): you'll find your Indian philosophy in courses offered by the South Asian
Studies department, but not, for the most part, by the philosophy department. If there
is an occasional course of this sort, it will likely be slotted under the generic 'NonWestern Philosophy' label. It is the residual class: what is left over when the real
work of philosophy has been taken care of.
4.
Harman and Hegel are in fact not so far apart: both take philosophy to be an
autonomous discipline, unconnected to the study of culture. Wilson is not so far from
them either: she recognizes that one has to engage with the efflorescences of culture –
not just “foreign” languages, but also, when necessary, literary forms such as the
philosophical novel or poem—but only as a means to the end that she shares with
Harman and Hegel alike: autonomous engagement with philosophical ideas. The
great difference between the three of them lies in the different ways each engages
with tradition: Harman rejects it as a quagmire of exegetical illusions; Wilson steps
cautiously into it, while not seeing her work as exegetical at all, but only as looking
for philosophical fruit in the European philosophical tradition’s past; Hegel embraces
a single tradition, and fully, indeed he sees philosophy as itself constituted by the
“unfolding” of this tradition, ontologized in his mind as the “absolute Idea”. This Idea,
however, this ultimate ground of human existence, is and must remain, for Hegel, a
discretely, pure-bloodedly Greco-European thing.
Anglo-American academic Philosophy would indeed have remained stuck with
this unattractive selection of options, had its hidden Hegelian presuppositions not
been seriously shaken over the past few decades by certain important social changes
Griechen von einem Uranos, Kronos – der Zeit, aber auch schon individualisiert – hören, so finden wir
bei den Persern Zerwana Akarana, aber es ist die unbegrenzte Zeit. Wir finden Ormuzd und Ahriman
als ganz allgemeine Weisen, Vorstellungen; sie erscheinen als allgemeine Prinzipien, die so
Verwandtschaft mit der Philosophie zu haben scheinen oder selbst als Philosophen erscheinen.”
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that extend throughout all of academia and indeed throughout much of the broader
society in North America and in parts of Europe. In particular, since the early 1990s,
when Harman was promoting chronological ethnocentrism, and Wilson was
cautiously stepping out of the strictest formation of this prejudice, ethnocentrism in
the strict and literal sense has become significantly harder to maintain as a vision of
the world. In the academic context, the majority of younger professors are now very
attuned to the ethnic and gender composition of the academic crowds they move in,
and almost everyone agrees that too many 'white men' can have a detrimental effect
on the flourishing of philosophical inquiry. The presumption is that the demographic
homogeneity leads directly to a philosophical homogeneity, that in order for there to
be a maximum diversity of views, there must be a maximum diversity of subtypes of
human being. Diversification of the curriculum, in turn, becomes instrumentalized as
a way of attracting a greater diversity of people, who will in turn, it is expected, bring
with them a greater diversity of points of view.
There surely is a connection between demographic and philosophical diversity,
and diversifying the curriculum is surely one of the ways of changing the
demography. There has been little reflection, however, on how the categories that are
salient in current social reality correspond to the categories with which we may
usefully divide up the history of various philosophical traditions. To consider an
obvious example, there does not seem to have been, in 17th century Europe, a
category, “women”, that included all biologically female human beings in its
denotation and that involved, in its connotations, all or even many of the same ideas
and values associated with that term in the early-21st-century educated West. There
were queens and duchesses who wrote philosophical treatises and carried on
correspondences with canonical male philosophers, but it is not at all clear that in
doing so they thought of themselves as realizing a capacity that was shared, equally,
with women fishmongers or peasants. To take another example: however we today
racialize Asian people who enter into the demographic mix of American or European
academia, it is fairly safe to say that no Indian philosopher in the classical period
thought of himself as a “person of color”. If “color” enters into a traditional Sanskrit
pandit's self-conception at all, it does so as varṇa—literally “color”, but also
“caste”—and here the pandit's “color” places him squarely on top of the social
hierarchy. It is true that beginning in the Mughal period, the Persian Islamicate elite
introduced quasi-racial distinctions, in which darker skin reflected lower status, and
that these Persian distinctions in turn played an important role in the French
philosopher François Bernier's supposedly novel 1684 racial typology (the first of its
kind in Europe, anyhow) (Rubiés 2013). But the fact remains that ‘woman’, ‘person
of color’, and other salient terms in today’s academic and social landscape, are
historically constituted terms, indeed constructed categories, and they do not help us
in any significant way to understand what Elizabeth of Bohemia or Gaṅgeśa’s
philosophical projects were all about, let alone what the social conditions were that
made these projects make sense.
One thus fears that if Elizabeth or Gaṅgeśa are added to the curriculum simply in
order to assure students, and potential future professors, that philosophy includes
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“people like me”, there is something of a swindle taking place. One senses that
scholars ought to be studying the conditions of this appearance of “likeness”, not
presuming it at the outset. One fears, moreover, that this presumption amounts to a
sort of variation on Harman's notion of “exegetical thinking”, except that now one
reads one's very identity back into texts, rather than just one's own views, so that one
can read that identity back out, as Harman says, endowed with authority.
5.
Elizabeth and Gaṅgeśa are prime candidates for canonization: they are innovative,
original thinkers, and they left ample textual evidence of this. The latter fact, their
literacy and their access to the means of textual dissemination of ideas, are a
reflection of their elite status in society (Elizabeth is far more elite within her society
than Gaṅgeśa within his).
These considerations do not much trouble the mainstream campaign within
Anglo-American academic philosophy for diversification. This casual indifference is
peculiar. In some ways we might see the recent surge of interest among analytic
philosophers in the cluster of problems grouped under the label of ‘standpoint
epistemology’—roughly, the idea that who you are in society determines the range of
things you might believe or might be pragmatically able to say, and also determines
the range of interpretations that other members of society will give to what you say—
as a rather delayed echo of some of the principal insights of postcolonial theory and
its later descendant, Subaltern Studies, for the development of which Indian
intellectuals have played a crucial role (Chatterjee 2000). Characteristically, analytic
philosophy ignores its debt, is for the most part unaware of this heritage, and leaves
important elements of it out.
Subaltern Studies in particular has been centrally concerned with finding ways to
draw out the voice of those who are, under a given social or political order, voiceless,
notably members of the Dalit classs in India, whose modes of communication
typically do not involve texts or systematic arguments. The task of finding the voices
of the subaltern has led the members of this movement to develop rather rigorous and
complex philological methods for drawing out submerged points of view. These
methods often yield something in the spirit of Carlo Ginzburg’s influential
microhistorical study, The Cheese and the Worms, in which the voice, and the
cosmological representations, of a 16th-century Italian peasant are recovered from a
rare court transcript that preserved, in an official record of the Inquisition, a trace of
the popular imagination, spoken in dialect (Ginzburg 1980 [1976]). James H. Sweet,
to provide another example of this sort of approach from a different part of the world,
has recently offered a rich reconstruction of the thought-world of a 16th-century
Afro-Brazilian slave and herbalist, who was tried in a Portuguese court for deviltry
(Sweet 2011). The slave, Domingos Alvares, defended himself on the grounds that he
was interested only in herbs, not the devil, and in the course of this defense we learn a
considerable amount about the naturalist knowledge, inscribed within a long African
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intellectual tradition, of a non-textual thinker, indeed a natural philosopher, whom
history would otherwise have forgotten.
By multiplying the examples in this way I am hoping to motivate the conclusion
that adequate attention to the worlds of the traditionally voiceless will necessarily
involve both scholarly approaches that go beyond those suitable for studying
canonical or easily canonizable texts, and will necessarily involve a rejection of the
Hegelian view that philosophy embedded in culture—for example in the botanical
knowledge required to treat tropical diseases—is not really philosophy at all.
Interestingly, we find just such a rejection in many of the programmatic proposals
for the advancement of non-European philosophy made by intellectuals in Asia, Latin
America, and most of all Africa, beginning in the mid-20th-century period of
decolonialization. Thus, for example, at the Second Congress of Negro Writers and
Artists, held in Rome in 1959, the participants in the Commission on Philosophy
declare “that the African philosopher must base his inquiries upon the fundamental
certainty that the Western philosophic approach is not the only possible one; and
therefore... that the African philosopher should learn from the traditions, tales, myths,
and proverbs of his people, so as to draw from them the laws of a true African
wisdom” (Asante and Abarry 1996, 231-32).
This is an approach to the study of philosophy that is in one sense diametrically
opposed to Hegel’s. It says that philosophy embedded in culture is philosophy in the
fullest sense. This is also an approach that would yield very rich studies of the
conceptual world of many African cultures, as for instance in Alexis Kagame’s 1976
study, La philosophie Bantu, which sets out from the Danish linguist Louis
Hjelmslev's dictum that “there is no philosophy without linguistics”, and goes on to
construct a systematic philosophy for Bantu-speaking peoples out of the semantics
and etymologies of the various Bantu natural languages (Kagame 1976). Kagame
does not claim that there is a specialized class of members of Bantu-speaking
societies consciously engaged in an activity that may be called ‘philosophy’, but only
that the natural languages of all members of Bantu societies contain, so to speak, a
latent philosophy, to which everyone in these societies has immediate access simply
in virtue of their mastery of the languages. In a somewhat similar vein, in an
influential volume edited by the late Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze, we learn a great deal
about oral traditions and values, and also quite a bit about what may be called 'folk
science'. For example, there is a section on Yoruba physics, which includes a
discussion of a rain-predicting hygrometer constructed from saliva expectorated by a
Yoruba farmer into his hand and held up to the wind (Eze 1998).
While denying Hegel's separation of philosophy from culture, in another sense
these works reinforce it. They effectively agree with Hegel that there is a legitimate
distinction to be made between the forms of thought of non-Europeans and those of
Europeans: the latter have their philosophy expressed in a high-culture, institutionally
sanctioned, systematic tradition, while the former have their philosophy diffused
throughout all of culture and natural language. This creates a manifest double
standard, to the extent that it fails to recognize, for example, that European farmers
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too have comparable methods of rain prediction, but that in Europe these do not get to
count as philosophy.
To the extent that philosophy is permitted to be culture-embedded outside of the
Greco-European tradition, but expected to be culture-autonomous within that tradition,
there can be no hope for a unified or cohesive conception of the project of philosophy.
The serious study of the least systematized, the least institutionally affirmed, the least
textually canonized traditions will continue to be neglected, and if they are considered
philosophy by those who conceptualize the project of philosophy in institutional,
canonical, and textual terms, they will be so only as a matter of courtesy. Africa will
remain the most disadvantaged. Special cases will be made for India and China, as
insititutionally complex, literate civilizations, but here too their inclusion will be a
matter of approximation of a standard set by the conventions and institutions valued
by Hegel and like-minded Westerners.
6.
What then is to be done? To begin, we must free ourselves of our remaining Hegelian
prejudices. This is not as difficult as it might seem, for indeed there is a long preHegelian tradition in European philosophy, recognizing the culture-embedded
philosophy of traditions that do not descend from ancient Greece as philosophy in the
fullest sense. In the 1740s Johann Jakob Brucker wrote extensively on the philosophy
of the Celts, the Scythians, etc., as though it was just obvious that they had such a
thing (Brucker 1742-44). Joseph-François Lafitau wrote similarly on the philosophy
of the Iroquois in the 1720s (Lafitau 1724). In fact the idea that the search for wisdom
might go beyond textual traditions and someday include what can be called 'folk
philosophy' was not just a curiosity suggested by scattered minor figures. Canonical
figures such as G. W. Leibniz, too, seem to have been keen on the idea that the study
of culture-embedded thought, of oral traditions and popular wisdom, might well be
the ultimate frontier of a philologically grounded philosophy. Thus Leibniz writes in
the New Essays concerning Human Understanding of 1704:
When the Latins, Greeks, Hebrews and Arabs shall someday be exhausted, the Chinese,
supplied also with ancient books, will enter the lists and furnish matter for the curiosity of
our critics. Not to speak of some old books of the Persians, Armenians, Copts and
Brahmins, which will be unearthed in time so as not to neglect any light antiquity may
give on doctrines by tradition and on facts by history (Leibniz 1849-60, 5, 318).

With these textual traditions mastered, Leibniz thinks that the real work will have just
begun: “And if there were no longer an ancient book to examine, languages would
take the place of books, and they are the most ancient monuments of mankind”
(Leibniz 1849-60, 5, 318). Leibniz's injunction seems to echo in turn through the
work of later German humanists such as J. G. Herder, who would in turn influence
the anthropological projects of Franz Boas and Zora Neale Hurston, who in their own
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ways sought to discern, so to speak, the unity in the multiplicity. Kagame's project,
too, would amount to a sort of realization of Leibniz's prediction.
So the first major obstacle to greater inclusiveness, the casting off of the Hegelian
prejudice, proves fairly easy: there are ample alternatives to such a limiting
conception of philosophy even within the European intellectual tradition. A further
obstacle, which must be overcome, in addition to the Hegelian elevation of a single
tradition above all others, is the Harmanian rejection of tradition tout court. I hope to
have established by now that we all work and think within traditions, and that the
work of the philosophical scholar ought to include some interest in surveying the
diversity of traditions. I hope to have established, also, that there is no good reason
not to presume full equality of all traditions at the outset, regardless of differences in
their mechanisms of transmissions (e.g., textual, oral), or of the degrees of
systematization of their commitments from within the traditions themselves. If there
is less systematization, as in the case of Bantu philosophy, this simply means that
there may be additional work for the scholar to carry out in order to draw it out in a
way that will enable outsiders to appreciate it. But the simple difficulty of accessing
something can be no evidence for its non-existence, any more than damaged portions
of papyri, rendering bits of text illegible, may justify the conclusion that the missing
words must have been the unimportant ones. Challenges are not grounds for neglect,
but on the contrary for redoubled effort.
There is, further, no contradiction between continuing to work within a tradition,
and developing a scholarly interest in the diversity of traditions. This is a banal truth
to scholars in the other human sciences. No Mesopotamianist believes that she must
abandon her society's system of time measurement in order to study Babylonian
calendars. But this does not prevent her from learning things from these calendars
about the way humans grapple with and think about the passage of time. Only
philosophers remain as if phobic about potential contamination from foreign belief
systems.
Finally, it will be necessary to reject the ‘area studies’ approach to different
philosophical traditions. This approach continues to reign, and to needlessly limit, the
study of human history and culture in several university departments, creating
artificial boundaries that reflect linguistic, or current geopolitical realities, but that
neglect real relations of exchange and communication between regions. Thus for
example there can be no good scholarly reason, as Karine Chemla has compellingly
shown, to study the history of Chinese mathematics as, principally, a Chinese matter
(Chemla 2012). There are so many transregional connections and ramifications in the
spread of mathematical ideas and techniques that to confine the focus to a national or
regional scale is to fail to adequately understand the subject in question. The same is
certainly the case for European mathematics. Yet this is hard to see, in large part
because here too there is a strong urge toward canonization. We want to attach names
to innovations. Thus we have the “Leibniz series”, for dealing with the infinite
expansions of trigonometric sine, cosine, and arctangent functions. We have recently
agreed to start calling this the “Leibniz-Mādhava series”, in recognition of the Indian
mathematician Mādhava of Sangamagrama, who seems to have worked it out roughly
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three centuries before Leibniz. We may presume, in turn, that there are countless
intermediaries whose names will never be known—Persians, Arabs, French and
Italian Jesuits, who brought it about that forms of thinking might diffuse from South
Asia to Europe so as to make Leibniz's “discovery” possible. The adequate study of
this sort of mathematical discovery is the one that does not permit it to remain the
property of one or two discoverers, or of any particular national or regional tradition.
Its nature is best grasped by the approach that academic historians have come to call
‘connected history’ (Subrahmanyam 2005a, Subrahmanyam 2005b).
7.
It is a reasonable hypothesis, one that I intend to let guide all of my own future work,
and that I would like to encourage other historians of philosophy to adopt as well, that
all of the history of philosophy might best be approached in this way: as global,
connected history. There are traditions, pace Harman, and they are inescapable. But
they are not, pace Hegel, discrete or autochthonous expressions of something special
in one exceptional culture or in a limited number of cultures. They are, rather, local
inflections of a universal human capacity. The capacity we call ‘philosophy’—the
conceptual engagement with the nature of reality and of our place in reality—finds its
inflection in all human cultures, and there are channels of transmission and exchange
of philosophical ideas between cultures, even apparently 'static' cultures, to which we
will never be able to attach the proper names of innovative thinkers.
In order to adequately appreciate these facts, and to study these philosophical
inflections in an adequate way, we need to recognize that the study of philosophy is,
among other things, the study of culture. Such a transformation, I maintain, is a
necessary precondition of any future form of academic philosophy that will satisfy the
current desideratum of greater inclusiveness.
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